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In Volume I of Religion and the Constitution, Kent 
Greenawalt explains the rationale for non-establishment of relig-
ion, in part, by claiming that "personal autonomy is most fully 
recognized and the flourishing of religion itself is best served if 
the government does not sponsor religious understandings and 
practices."1 This sentence ends with a parenthetical promising 
that this subject will be addressed in Volume II. In that volume, 
he defines autonomy as "unfettered freedom to choose among 
various options, whether or not an absence of freedom restricts 
one's exercise of his convictions" (p. 9). He then writes: "In this 
sense, even if every citizen is free to practice religion as she 
chooses, including the freedom to practice no religion, full 
autonomy of choice is limited if the government 'stacks the deck' 
in favor of one religion or all religions" (p. 9). 
Just how is the freedom to choose among options fettered 
by the government supporting one or another religion? 
Greenawalt's explanation of this point is fragmentary and incon-
clusive. That such a superb scholar falters on such a fundamental 
point suggests to me that autonomy is a mask for other concerns 
that Greenawalt is reluctant, for respectable but ultimately un-
persuasive reasons, to spell out. 
The most obvious objection to an autonomy-based argu-
ment against "deck-stacking" is that it makes no sense to de-
nounce the deliberate creation of choice-influencing circum-
stances. People's preferences and choices are inevitably shaped 
in non-rational ways by their environment. George Sher asks, 
"exactly what is disrespectful about taking (benign) advantage of 
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a causal process that would occur anyway?"2 More specifically, 
establishment, unless it involves tangible disabilities for mem-
bers of minority religions, does not impair individual autonomy 
at all. This is why establishment is not taken by international 
human rights instruments and tribunals to impair religious lib-
erty.3 
Greenawalt acknowledges that "government promotes all 
sorts of points of view over others" (p. 9), but notes that religion 
may be special, because: 
when a person's sense of her relationship to God (or 
gods) or to ultimate reality is concerned, the govern-
ment should particularly refrain from attempted influ-
ence. This stance is based both on the essential nature of 
the questions religions address [meaning, it shortly be-
comes clear, the way in which establishment can corrupt 
both religion and government] and on the government's 
incompetence to deal with them (p. 9). 
In the pages that follow, he elaborates on these considerations.~ 
These may be sound arguments. I happen to think they are. 5 But 
what have corruption and incompetence to do with autonomy? 
The basic problem is that the idea of autonomy is too ab-
stract to be a basis for religious liberty. One problem is that 
which, Greenawalt acknowledges, John Garvey has raised: "any 
principle of maximizing autonomy would cover many areas of 
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choice that do not receive similar constitutional protection" (p. 
486).6 Greenawalt responds that autonomy is only one of the 
concerns of the religion clauses: a clause can fit multiple justifi-
cations even though it does not fit any one of them perfectly. 
But if the law is barred from manipulating people in reli-
gious directions (and thus violating their autonomy). while it re-
mains free to manipulate them in nonreligious directions (and 
thus violate their autonomy in exactly the same way), it is hard 
to see how autonomy as such is what is being protected. 
The idea that religious freedom serves autonomy makes 
sense only if it relies, sub silentio, on something like Joseph 
Raz's view that "[a ]utonomy is valuable only if exercised in pur-
suit of the good" and that "[t]he ideal of autonomy requires only 
the availability of morally acceptable options. "7 Religion would 
then be protected because it is an option that is particularly 
valuable. 
Greenawalt is reluctant to say that American law treats re-
ligion as such as a good thing.R The reason is easy to see. There is 
an obvious danger in Raz's type of approach. Timothy Macklem, 
whose work is heavily indebted to Raz. proposes that before 
courts protect religion in any case, they undertake "a frank ex-
amination of the contribution that any doctrine held on the basis 
of faith, be it traditional or non-traditional, is capable of making 
to well-being."9 In a pluralistic society, there are obvious dangers 
in giving judges the power to assign legal consequences to differ-
ent religious beliefs based on the judges' own conceptions of 
well-being. Macklem's own confident withholding of protection 
from "cults" is not reassuring. 10 
I think that the most promising alternative to Macklem's 
approach is to treat as valuable, not autonomy, but religion-
understood, however, in the somewhat vague way that 
Greenawalt has proposed. 11 "Religion" in American law, 
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294 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:291 
Greenawalt has argued, denotes a set of phenomena that are 
grouped together by nothing more than a kind of family resem-
blance: there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
will make something a "religion. "1c 
Macklem objects to Greenawalt's approach, arguing that 
the question of what "religion" conventionally means is a seman-
tic one. but the question of what beliefs are entitled to special 
treatment is a moral one, and it requires a moral rather than a 
semantic answer. 13 Macklem"s analytical point is sound. But 
there are powerful reasons for denying the state the power to 
judge the objective value of particular religions-reasons that 
Macklem inadvertently displays. The decision to define religion 
vaguely. relying on the fuzzy semantic meaning, itself rests on 
moral grounds: the considerations about corruption and incom-
petence that Greenawalt tries to shoehorn into the category of 
autonomy. Non-establishment aims, not at autonomy. but at the 
substantive good of the citizens, described in an appropriately 
14 
vague way. 
This would also help to explain Greenawalt's qualified sup-
port for the argument, advanced in different ways by Michael 
McConnell and Douglas Laycock, that government try to leave 
religion to private choices, to the extent that this is possible. 
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager reject that claim as 
incoherent, because a world in which religion is unaffected by 
government is unimaginable.15 Greenawalt responds that the ba-
sic idea, which is not at all incoherent, is "that basic functions of 
government would be taken for granted and that within that con-
text the aspiration would be freedom of choice" (p. 453). He also 
legal concept with unparalleled thoroughness and care. 
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thinks that this determination to maximize freedom of religious 
choice "can only be one side of a balance. telling us whether or 
not something is being sacrificed in terms of the government's 
relation to religion, but not whether a law overall is justified" (p. 
455). So freedom of religious choice seems to be something of 
special value-enough value to force us to think about whether 
something government is doing, which conflicts with religious 
choice, is an exercise of the "basic functions of government" or is 
more dispensable. No such balancing is called for, evidently, 
w.hen the law interferes with nonreligious choice. Again. it is 
hard to see what sense this makes unless one stipulates what 
Greenawalt is reluctant to say, that religion as such is being 
treated as especially valuable in some way. 
